I better be quick about writing this because the underlying facts probably have a short shelf life. I learn that Mr. Trump now is expressing support for NATO [hat tip Noah Milman], seems to be taking a seemingly less extremist stance stance regarding China, and seems to be distancing himself from his alt-right advisor, Steve Bannon [paywall probably applies]. Are these indications of a sometimes-discussed “pivot” toward more responsible governance?
Maybe….but we have to decide what kind of pivot we’re talking about.
Then there’s the personal pivot. This is personal change resulting from an honest self-assessment. It can come quickly, as in a road to Damascus conversion experience. Or it can come gradually, and observable only long after the pivoting began. I don’t see any fish scales falling from Mr. Trump’s eyes, and if he is on the painful, gradual road to a personal reevaluation, we won’t know for at least a few years.
There’s the institutional pivot. This doesn’t preclude a personal change, but it relies on the sets of incentives and constraints that work on the presidency. As I have tried to argue before,
But the argument that Mr. Trump will grow into the presidency doesn’t rely only on the proposition that he’ll become a better person. It also relies on the claim that our system of checks and balances might actually work and that the federal bureaucracy will do what bureaucracies do and somehow condition what Mr. Trump can accomplish.
I’d add other factors to “checks and balances’ and “federal bureaucracy”: federalism, civil society, the press, individual acts of resistance. In this second sense, it’s possible we’re about to see a pivot.
However and as with the first sense, we probably won’t really know it’s a true pivot for several years. One reason among many I distrust Mr. Trump is that he seems to change his mind on a whim. Pivoting hither and yon from one day to the next isn’t the type of pivot I’m hoping for.
We also need to keep perspective. I think it’s a good thing that Mr. Trump seems to be (this week) distancing himself from Mr. Bannon. But he shouldn’t have hired him in the first place. He should have laughed away the suggestion when it was made. And “distancing himself from” isn’t the same as firing.
There’s finally the disturbing point that we are–or at least I am–looking for any sign of change and clinging to it, hoping it’s change for real or at least contenting ourselves that it’s not quite as bad at he moment as it seemed and may again seem at other times. Maybe the king won’t show up to parliament in his underwear. Maybe the emperor will put on some clothes for once. I suppose it’s kind of like dreading the moment an abuser comes home only to be relieved that tonight he’s in a good mood.
This OP is a review of George Simon Jr.’s Character Disturbance: The Phenomenon of Our Age (Little Rock: Parkhurst Brothers, 2011).
Simon wants to warn lay readers about, and advise therapists on how to treat, what he calls “character disturbance.” In its more severe stages, character disturbance leads to “character disorders,” among which we can see varying degrees of personality styles that in their more extreme form might include what we know as pathological narcissism, “borderline” behavior, and sociopathy and psychopathy. We can identify character disturbances by choices people make, unfettered or insufficiently fettered, by the feelings of guilt and shame that afflict the rest of us.
Simon contrasts disturbed characters with “neurotics.” These are susceptible to “the conflict that rages between primal urges and qualms of conscience.” (That quotation comes from a blog post Simon has written. But he says basically the same thing, if less quotably, on page 13 of his book.) The average layperson and most therapists too often treat disturbed characters as neurotics acting from neurosis-like motivations. It’s more useful, however, to consider that disturbed characters simply do what they do to get what they want as soon as they can and with the least amount of work possible. We should hold them responsible for their actions, and therapists should use Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (with a focus on the “behavioral”) to give them the tools to change.
Character disturbance is the “phenomenon of our age” because our present-day society and culture encourage people to value their self-esteem over their self-respect. People with character disturbance already have a high self-esteem. They just don’t have the self-respect necessary to feel shame at what their actions show them to be.
The myth of our disturbed age
The book’s subtitle (“the phenomenon of our age”), preface, epilogue, and incidental remarks throughout all point to two questionable assumptions. The first is that character disturbance and character disorders are on the rise. The second is that the manner in which our current culture promotes and condones those ways of acting is unprecedented or somehow unique. Both assumptions imply that our current “near epidemic” [p. 14] is new and dangerous and threatens to undermine “the very foundations of our free society.” [p. 19].
I defer in part and dissent in part. I defer to Simon’s claims about his profession (he’s a former therapist, now writer). He says that therapists in the US are generally trained in the “classical” model of neurosis, with nary a regard for treating character disturbance as a thing in itself. This classical model does a poor job of treating individuals with character disturbance so that in recent decades, therapists whose clients have character disturbances do not treat them effectively. If Simon is wrong on these points, that’s something someone with more knowledge than I about the mental health professions and clinical practice can pursue.
I dissent, though, that we can know with Simon’s confidence that character disturbance is more prevalent now than before and that “self-esteem culture” is somehow unique in the way it encourages character disturbance. Maybe self-esteem culture from ca. 1970 onward condones and encourages character disturbance, but other cultural trends from different eras could plausibly have done the same. I offer as one example white supremacy and the “lynch law” it inspired in the era of Jim Crow. You can probably think of other examples.
I dissent also because it probably doesn’t matter. Whether character disturbance is more prevalent, less prevalent, or about as prevalent as before, it is still a problem that needs to be addressed. If it is indeed a “near epidemic,” then I guess we need to take more assertive measures, rethink our notions of crime and punishment, or go beyond the “political correctness…and the tendency to put personal beliefs and interests ahead of the general welfare”–all of which “impair our ability to conduct an honest discourse and debate.” (p. 252).
But any “honest discourse” has to consider the limitations of what we know. One of Simon’s key points of evidence–our rising prison population–could have other causes in addition to increased incidence of character disturbance. One might argue that the rising prison population represents society taking a firmer stand against character disturbance and disturbed characters are now facing their comeuppance. I don’t endorse that argument, but it’s consistent with Simon’s evidence and yet also runs against the point he wishes to draw from that evidence.
Continuums and sharp distinctions
Simon posits a “continuum” between neurosis and character disturbance [p. 29]. Someone is neurotic to the extent that they don’t have a character disturbance. Someone has a character disturbance to the extent that they are not neurotic.
Simon also notes the promise of a third way out of the continuum and toward what he calls “self-actualization altruism.” Those who approach this altruism “freely and completely commit themselves to advancing the greater good. They are not neurotic because they have no driving desire to avoid guilt or shame for doing otherwise. Also, they’re not out for personal glory or to be revered by society.” [p. 29, italics in original] He doesn’t dwell on that point. In fact, he’s skeptical that there is a third way out and suggests that for practical purposes his continuum makes more sense.
But even so, I’d like to see more discussion about the continuum than Simon offers. Too quickly he jumps from discussing the continuum to distinguishing between neurotics and people with character disturbance. He does not discuss the positions on the continuum where many (most?) of us likely fall. Maybe the turn toward “self-actualization altruism” happens never or only rarely. But is there then, as an alternative, an optimal place on the continuum for us to be?
Such a discussion is probably beyond the scope of the book. Perhaps Simon needs to draw sharp distinctions because 1) his audience includes laypersons like me as well as experts like him; 2) his goal is to warn us about character disturbances and advise us on how to deal with them; and 3) you can cover only so much in any book and still have it be readable.
So…you know it when you see it?
Let’s grant that for sake of readability Simon must make sharp distinctions between the character-disturbed and the rest of us, but how do we know who the character-disturbed or character-disordered are? He gives some clues, especially in Chapter 6, “Habitual Behavior Patterns Fostering and Perpetuating Character Disturbance.” Most of these patterns boil down to denying or deflecting responsibility for harmful actions.
But in a broader sense, how do we know, especially in the “edge” cases where someone is character “disturbed” but not badly enough to be character “disordered”? How do we–especially the laypersons who seem to be part of Simon’s target audience–discern whether someone is character disturbed as opposed to being neurotically disturbed?
Maybe if someone acts like a character disturbed person, we should treat them as such for our own self-protection and let the mental health professionals sort out the underlying causes. It’s probably on balance good to learn how to call out responsibility deflection whether or not the deflector is a disturbed character or merely an anguished neurotic. In some cases, it’s probably better to simply disengage regardless of where the deflector falls on the continuum.
Maybe we shouldn’t seek to “know.” Maybe judgment is for the Lord, and discernment is for a competent and licensed mental health professional. But that doesn’t sit well with me, either. One purpose of Simon’s work is to warn laypersons like me about these people. And while provisionally speaking I can learn a lot about how to respond to responsibility avoidance, part of how I respond depends on my general assessment of their character. If someone resorts to the trick of changing the subject when I bring up a problem it matters a lot to me whether that’s a one-off or part of a pattern of behavior.
Maybe the trick, then, is to find patterns. But there are patterns and then patterns on the patterns. Maybe I’ve just been lucky, but even the people I’ve known who I consider “character disordered” sometimes defy their own patterns.
The problem of suffering and compassion
My concern about knowing or discerning plays into another concern. If we actually have–and can say with confidence we have–an according to Hoyle disordered person before us, what role ought our compassion toward that person play?
Simon seems to say that the first compassionate thing to do would be to empower and help the victims. The second compassionate thing would be to help disturbed/disordered characters learn how to act differently. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (with an emphasis on the “Behavioral”) can help–provided the disturbed/disordered character accepts responsibility for his or her actions and actually is willing to do what is necessary to change.
What about before the magic moment(s) when the disturbed/disordered person realizes they need to change? I think Simon would say the best we can do is call them on their tactics and make them take responsibility for what they do. In those cases, “compassion” is beside the point.
But I’m left to wonder, do disturbed/disordered characters “suffer”? Simon seems to say no, at least not as “neurotics” do. Or if disturbed characters do suffer, it’s only to the degree that they’re also neurotic (remember the continuum above). Disturbed/disordered characters are basically out to get what they want. Simon might concede that getting everything one wishes betokens a deeper and underlying, unhappiness or suffering. But I think he would suggest that we should focus on the behaviors and bracket the other types of questions as not useful.
Neurotics come off pretty good in Simon’s book. To the extent that he’s targeting a lay audience, he’s primarily targeting neurotics–and perhaps also the “self-actualizing altruists”– and not the disturbed characters qua disturbed characters. Neurotics make bad choices. But the key to helping them is work through the underlying issues, whatever those may be, in addition to introducing them to better coping behaviors.
Disturbed characters are different from you and me, especially if their disturbance is extreme enough to mark them as “disordered.” There’s hope for them, to be sure. At one point (I can’t find the page number), he suggests that even those we’d call seriously psychopathic might ultimately attain something like redemption or rehabilitation. But he seems to want our takeaway to be that they are the bad guys (and gals). And we, who presumably fall somewhere on the “optimal” range of the “neurotic”/”disordered” continuum, are the good people just trying to survive. That bothers me, even if he’s right. Especially if he’s right.
There’s something missing. Periodically, Simon hints that he too was once been a disturbed character, too. He refers (without specific examples) to other times of his life before he saw the light and started to change his behavior. He doesn’t go into detail. And he probably shouldn’t because that’s not the book he’s to be writing. However, if he ever chooses to write that book, I’ll be sure to read it.
Dr. X, a friend of Hitcoffee, has warned against what some mental health professionals call the Dark Triad. This triad is, to quote Dr. X, a “personality organization that comprises three psychological traits: psychopathy, narcissism and Machiavellianism.” People with that personality organization are dangerous. They are a problem that needs to be dealt with, especially if they are a coworker or in a position of responsibility.
What do we do with such people? In the comment thread to that post, Dr. X suggests that we fire them. To me, the obligation to fire implies that we shouldn’t hire in the first place. If the dark triadic person is not independently wealthy and yet can’t or shouldn’t be hired, how should he or she fend for themselves? Perhaps once properly identified–either through that person’s actions or through some sort of deep analysis–then we ought to consider civil commitment, or prison if justified. Or you can do the Philip K. Dick option: hunt down the androids and eliminate them. I reject that “solution” as does Dr. X and most (all?) others I”ve heard speak on it. But the terms of the discussion are consistent with certain conclusions.
Absent in the discussion on that thread and in the material Dr. X cites (or at least in the quoted portions of that material…I didn’t read the linked-to articles), is a discussion of whether this personality organization is just how or what someone is, or if it has a (personal) history. If people develop into that organization or develop out of it. Not to call this an illness–it’s not clear to me that the language of “personality organization” is a language about illness–but…is there a cure? Or are people just like that?
I’m obviously uncomfortable with the idea. Maybe it’s naivete or wishful thinking. If such people exist, then they exist whether I like it or not. If almost by definition such people don’t seek to change or improve or grow, then they don’t. Sometimes survival and defense of the common good are important. My wish that such people who would imperil either don’t exist doesn’t mean that they don’t.
These discussions remind me of the “mark of Cain” from Genesis. I thought it would be cool to incorporate an allusion to that story when talking about such people. But then I actually read the story, probably for the first time since I was a child. The story starts out as I remember. Cain kills Abel out of jealousy or envy or whatever. The Lord punishes him: “When you till the ground, it shall no longer yield its strength to you. A fugitive and a vagabond you shall be on the earth”
But it doesn’t end there. Cain complains that it “will happen that anyone who finds me will kill me.” To that the Lord commands that “whoever kills Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold.” And he sets a “mark” on Cain to warn people not to harm him.
I’m no expert in Biblical interpretations, and I imagine that that passage has been interpreted and reinterpreted through the ages. There’s also a point of unclarity. The referent “him” on whom vengeance is to be meted sevenfold strikes me as amphibolous, at least in the version I’m quoting: I assume the vengeance is to be meted against the one who would harm Cain, but perhaps Cain is the recipient of the vengeance?
Still, the “mark” of Cain seems on my uninformed reading to be the opposite of what I had thought. It strikes me as a mark of mercy, or perhaps mercy tempered by a warning. People are not expressly forbidden to be wary of him or to stop him from further crimes, but they are forbidden to harm him.
Again, there may be other ways to interpret that story, and one might legitimately question whether that story ought to be a guide to anything. But that story exists and I can’t shake it, just like I can’t shake the possibility that dark triadic persons exist.
Rabbi Michael Lerner warns against psychoanalyzing/diagnosing Mr. Trump (or any political leader, for that matter), especially when such psychoanalysis is intended as a tool for opposition. He points out that it’s questionable to diagnose people without working with them for a long time in a therapeutic setting. Rather, he says, one should focus on actions instead of on the internal demons of one’s opponent. (Mr. Lerner lists other reasons as well. Read the whole thing.)
I’m inclined to agree. I get very uneasy when I read of a psychotherapist or other mental health professional diagnose a politician with a disorder.
Occam’s Razor can do some good here. If Mr. Trump is unstable, erratic, or unpredictable, his actions by themselves speak to how much we can trust him or how competent he is. Whether the diagnosis is right or wrong, we don’t need it.
Or mostly we don’t. Mr. Lerner’s warning is an “editorial note” to another piece, “Trump as Narcissist,” by Michael Brenner, also found at the above link.* Brenner makes several arguments that stand or fall on their own. But his key point is that Mr. Trump is a narcissist and we cannot expect the demands and incentives of the presidency to tame his narcissism.
That argument is marginally informed by whether Mr. Trump really and truly suffers from narcissism. If he does, there’s less hope that he’ll mature and grow into the presidency. If he doesn’t, there’s slightly more hope. And if a 25th amendment solution is at all in the offing, then maybe psychological unfitness is a way to invoke that process. (At the same time, I’m not sure we really want to invoke that process, and I am especially wary of admitting to that end testimony from mental health professionals who have not even met with Mr. Trump personally.) So…maybe diagnoses of the sort Mr. Brenner offers do some good after all.
But the argument that Mr. Trump will grow into the presidency doesn’t rely only on the proposition that he’ll become a better person. It also relies on the claim that our system of checks and balances might actually work and that the federal bureaucracy will do what bureaucracies do and somehow condition what Mr. Trump can accomplish. We may of course doubt whether any of this will happen or if it does, whether we’ll welcome what the country would look like afterward. (For example, I’m glad that Michael Flynn has quit the National Security Agency, but I also share Noah Millman’s concerns about the intelligence leaks that seem to have prompted his ouster.)
And for the record, I don’t believe there’s something epistemologically magical about the “months, or sometimes years” of working with a client that Mr. Lerner says is necessary to determine if a person suffers from a disorder. I acknowledge that the the diagnoser probably has to always base his or her decision on incomplete information. So maybe it’s not entirely fair for me to claim the public diagnoses lack sufficient information.
That acknowledgement, however, doesn’t change my mind that such health professionals are acting unprofessionally and to a certain extent dangerously in their public diagnoses. They’re contributing to a discourse in which mental illness is seen as something shameful or to be feared. To my mind they’re weaponizing techniques that originally were meant to help or at least understand people.
Such is not their intention, and it’s not everything that they’re doing. Some mental disorders and perhaps even “personality organizations” ought to disqualify a person from certain positions of responsibility, among them the presidency. When an apt case presents itself, then maybe these mental health professionals are doing a service in highlighting it. And as even Mr. Lerner notes, there is something to be said for noting certain “styles” of politics and cultural expression. He cites Christopher Lasch’s study of the American “culture of narcissism, and I could cite Richard Hofstadter’s essay on the “paranoid style” of American politics.
Maybe there’s no “pure” approach. Maybe some harm has to be done for a greater good. I will probably not convince these mental health professionals otherwise. But I urge them to at least acknowledge and more forthrightly address the dangers of what they’re doing.
*If you read Tikkun Olam a lot, you’ll find that Mr. Lerner often attaches editorial comments to essays he publishes but disagrees with.
A less discussed feature of the Mr. Trump’s much discussed travel ban from January 27, 2017 (See full text here)  imposes a temporary (120 day) ban on the US Refugee Admissions Program [USRAP]. The suspension can be found in section 5 of that order. Section 5, subsection B contains the following language:
Upon the resumption of USRAP [US Refugee Admissions Program] admissions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, is further directed to make changes, to the extent permitted by law, to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality [emphasis added by GC]. Where necessary and appropriate, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security shall recommend legislation to the President that would assist with such prioritization.
Subsection E has this language,
Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may jointly determine to admit individuals to the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but only so long as they determine that the admission of such individuals as refugees is in the national interest — including when the person is a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious persecution [emphasis added by GC], when admitting the person would enable the United States to conform its conduct to a preexisting international agreement, or when the person is already in transit and denying admission would cause undue hardship — and it would not pose a risk to the security or welfare of the United States.
These clauses seem to prioritize admitting Christian refugees in preference to Muslim refugees. As far as I know, the refugees the US is most likely to receive right now come from Muslim-majority countries. That fact (if it is a fact) suggests Christian refugees have one more tool to draw on than Muslims do when claiming asylum. These clauses also reinforce Mr. Trump’s statement elsewhere, on the Christian Broadcasting Network that he intends to prioritize Christians over others when it comes to admitting refugees .
On balance I think this preference is probably a bad thing. But it’s a closer call than I believed at first.
Is this constitutional?
That question is more for the lawyers in the audience, although my lack of legal training won’t prevent me from answering. There’s a lot I’d need to know, that I don’t know, to answer that question. The practical function of these religious exemptions would be to prioritize Christian refugees over Muslim ones. Whatever one thinks of such prioritization as policy, I don’t think it’s a slam dunk to say that it’s unconstitutional. Here, by “unconstitutional” I mean a federal court will strike it down.
My layperson’s understanding is that the federal judiciary grants wide latitude to the executive and to Congress in determining who gets let into the country. My layperson’s understanding might be incorrect. But I can imagine a non-specious argument to support the above-referenced clauses from the EOse in court. That argument would run like this:
- Religious persecution is a legitimate reason to grant asylum.
- Religious persecution must be defined somehow.
- Limiting “religious persecution” to minority religions is a commonsense way to make that definition, inasmuch that a member of a majority religion is unlikely to be persecuted because he or she is a member of that religion.
- The language of this exemption would enable members of other religions, including Muslims, to request asylum for religious reasons presuming they are fleeing states in which Islam is a minority religion.
If it so happens that the “he religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality” language has been a standard test used by past administrations (and I don’t know if it is), then one can advance a point number 5 to the argument above that the EO is only following precedent.
Even if such language is standard practice and even if courts have generally deferred to the “political branches” on such matters, standard practice and deference can change. But I do think that speaking strictly in legal terms, it’s not at all clear to me that this portion of the EO is unconstitutional.
More things I don’t know
In a discussion Over There on this matter, I was notified of a few things I didn’t even realize I didn’t know. I had trouble finding the exact comment, but someone suggested that “refugee status” ans “asylum status” are different things. I didn’t know that.
In another thread, or subthread, some people argued that I misconceived of how asylum/refugee status gets assigned and suggested that pre-Trump, the standard practice and statutory/treaty obligations were to grant asylum for religious persecution because people are targeted for their religion, regardless of whether theirs is a minority religion. Those comments–right or wrong, probably neither wholly one or the other–are further reminders that I’m not an expert in the legalities or the history of the matter.
But it’s a bad idea anyway
While I’m not prepared to say those portions of the EO are unconstitutional (again, using my constricted definition of “unconstitutional” as “something a federal court will likely strike down”), I’m prepared to say those exemptions are bad ideas.
My first concern is practical. As some said in the above-mentioned Ordinary Times subthread, the “religious minority” standard seems to assign to immigration officials the duty to define what is and isn’t a minority religion. How much does a religious practice have to differ from that of the majority to constitute a new religion? Can someone who practices a non-standard form of Islam (say, e.g., Wahabbism) claim religious asylum because it’s a “minority religion”? Is there some sort of creed people have to profess? Do they have to know how to say “shibboleth” [probably safe for work, but it is a Youtube video]?
My other concern builds on the practicalities. Does this impose in practice a religious test? To me, a religious test for obtaining asylum strikes me as wrong. If we generally accept applications for asylum for religious persecution, perhaps those who apply ought to demonstrate they face persecution for their religion, but ought not to have to demonstrate they profess a certain religion as a precondition.
But still I hedge my bets
In the original draft of this post, I contemplated saying the “Christian preference” clauses appeal to Christians who believe the Golden Rule comes with an asterisk:
Do unto others* as you would have others do unto you.
*….unless those others aren’t Christian, then do whatever the hell you want.
But two concerns suggest my inclination to oppose those clauses of the EO is not quite as defensible as I thought.
First, my “ought’s” here conflict with each other. What if a non-Christian is persecuted because they are believed to be Christian? Ought that person be able to claim religious asylum even though they’re not persecuted for “their” religion?
Second, what if a religious group or ethno-religious group faces persecution directed specifically at it? In that case, it doesn’t strike me as beyond the pale bad for the US to adopt a policy to help members of that group and it doesn’t strike me as beyond the pale bad to define that policy in such a way as to make it easier for them to claim asylum.
Consider this comment from Phil Ebersole at Unqualified Offerings:
….I have no problem with prioritizing Christian refugees, if that is the intent [of the clauses I mentioned above, which I had introduced into discussion there–GC]. Christians are subject to horrible persecution in the countries named under the order, as a result of the jihadist wars instigated by the United States and Saudi Arabia. They are persecuted even in the refugee camps, which is why they are under-represented among refugees admitted to the United States. They are 10 percent of the population of Syria, for example, but only a tiny number of the Syrian refugees admitted to the United States.
While I don’t read Ebersole’s blog much, it’s worth looking at and I think if you do, you’ll agree with me that Ebersole is no fanatic, right-wing or otherwise. Combine that with the fact that I’m just mostly ignorant of the situation in Syria or most of what goes on in West Asia. Yeah, I know there’s a civil war, and I know that ISIS exists, and I know probably enough facts to earn me at least a B- on the final exam for a current affairs 101 class. But that’s about it. If Ebersole is right, then perhaps that preference should somehow be policy. And because Congress dithers, maybe it is appropriate for the president to use what authority he has to expedite the policy.
What to oppose and why….that’s an important question
I fall back on my criticisms against the religious exemption” clauses of the EO as bad policy. If things are as bad as Ebersole describes, Mr. Trump could do better than restrict most refugees but make special exemption that in practice seems designed to favor Christians. Why not a blanket religious exemption? Of course, I’m pro-admitting more refugees than the US has already and have no particular objection to them being Muslim or Christian. So my priors are very different from Mr. Trump’s.
I also fall back on what’s unstated in the EO but stated at such events as that reported on the Christian Broadcasting Network. Whatever effect the EO may have in practice, and whatever policy I might theoretically support would be consistent with the EO, the spirit animating it seems to be malicious in a way that similar policies implemented by Mr. Obama would not seem to me to be. I’m not sure citing that “spirit of malice” would or should be a viable strategy to contest the EO in court, but it is, in my opinion, to be opposed.
If I or we are going to criticize what Mr. Trump does, we need to focus on the particulars and why. Do we oppose the EO because it’s unconstitutional, or is it unconstitutional because we oppose it? Do we oppose the EO because it seems to carve out a specific religious exemption, or do we oppose it because the exempted profess Christianity? Do we oppose it because it’s bad policy, or because it’s Mr. Trump’s policy? Maybe these contrasts aren’t as stark and “rhetorical” as they probably sound. Maybe Mr. Trump is so bad that even on-balance good (but still questionable) policies ought to be opposed.
In the meantime, of course, I realize that other people’s lives and livelihoods are affected much more immediately than mine are. I’m in the cheap seats and am able to write these notes from my computer without really having to face (at least for now, knock on wood) the reality of what the US chooses to do.
 Executive order, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” January 27, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states> [accessed February 4, 2017]
 David Brody, “Brody File Exclusive: President Trump Says Persecuted Christians Will Be Given Priority as Refugees,” The Brody File [blog], January 27, 2017 <http://www1.cbn.com/thebrodyfile/archive/2017/01/27/brody-file-exclusive-president-trump-says-persecuted-christians-will-be-given-priority-as-refugees> [accessed 1-30-2017]
[UPDATE: 1-29-2017: I stated in the original post that the EO has no list of countries. That was incorrect. It names Syria, and it refers to “section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12).” Upon inspection of that statute/code, I find that it refers to a program for visas that makes certain people ineligible, namely those who have “been at any time on or after March 1, 2011″ in Iraq or Syria or “in a country that is designated by the Secretary of State under section 4605(j) of title 50 (as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)), section 2780 of title 22, section 2371 of title 22, or any other provision of law, as a country, the government of which has repeatedly provided support of acts of international terrorism” or “in any other country or area of concern designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security.” In my quotes, I’ve left out references to certain paragraphs, etc.]
[UPDATE #2, 2-6-2017: Here’s the memo. Not sure when it was added, but I checked this morning.]
As you may have heard, there’s an uproar over Mr. Trump’s decision to issue a travel ban on Friday (Jan. 27, 2017) from selected countries and over that decision’s affect on people arriving within the last two days. See this WaPo article [paywall]  The why’s and wherefore’s of the ban and the impact it will have on immigrants and those who have been granted permanent resident status are being debated, and that’s where the key point of concern ought to lie.
But a question for Mr. Trump: Where is the order on your whitehouse.gov page? I couldn’t find it on the “presidential actions” tab that your press office uses to update citizens on what you’re doing. I had to hunt elsewhere for it and finally found the text of it at the New York Times. It’s probably listed somewhere at the Federal Register online, but I’m still a novice at navigating those pages.
Here’s the text the New York Times offers, saying it was supplied by the White House. That text itself doesn’t list the banned countries. I presume that list is found in an order issued by, say, the Department of Homeland Security.
I’m obviously implying that the White House is less than eager to be transparent on this issue. However, it’s quite possible that it’s my own inexperience at monitoring executive orders that’s making me have to rely on media sources. At any rate, now you have a link to it in case you wanted to read it. (Disclosure: I haven’t read it yet.)
 Brady Dennis, Jerry Markon, and Katherine Sahver, “Despite growing dissent, Trump gives no sign of backing down from travel ban,” Washington Post, January 29, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trump-gives-no-sign-of-backing-down-from-travel-ban/2017/01/29/4ffe900a-e620-11e6-b82f-687d6e6a3e7c_story.html [Accessed 1-29-2017].
 “Full executive order text: Trump’s action limiting refugees into the US,” New York Times, January 27, 2017 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/refugee-muslim-executive-order-trump.html [accessed 1-29-2017]
[Note: I’ve changed the title of this post on January 29, 2017. The original title was “Mr. Trump’s memos, #1: deportation priorities and sanctuary jurisdictions”]
On January 23, 2017, Mr. Trump issued an executive order, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States.”
The executive order does many things, and I will focus only on two of them. First, it declares that his administration will seek
Ensure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable Federal law [concerning immigration–GC] do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law
Second, the EO also sets guidelines for deportation priorities. The department of Homeland Security and the Justice Department are to prioritize for deportation those immigrants who
(a) Have been convicted of any criminal offense;
(b) Have been charged with any criminal offense, where such charge has not been resolved;
(c) Have committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal offense;
(d) Have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in connection with any official matter or application before a governmental agency;
(e) Have abused any program related to receipt of public benefits;
(f) Are subject to a final order of removal, but who have not complied with their legal obligation to depart the United States; or
(g) In the judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose a risk to public safety or national security.
It is unclear to me what federal funds can actually be denied. What I would need to know is how federal funds are currently granted to local jurisdictions and under what conditions. I suspect Congress allocates such funds either by directly dispensing it, by creating agencies that dispense the funds through prescribed rules, or by granting the executive branch the discretion in certain cases to allocate funds to local jurisdictions. Funds dispensed the first two ways, I presume, are “mandated by law” while those dispensed the second way would fall under Mr. Trump’s discretion.
I would also need to know whether a local jurisdiction would be able to sue in court if funds typically allocated for reasons unrelated to immigration enforcement are denied because that local jurisdiction refuses to comply with that enforcement. There may be a 10th amendment issue at stake. My non-lawyerly reading of NFIB v. Sibelius and of how the SCOTUS arrived at its decision in South Dakota v. Dole suggests the feds can go only so far in conditioning a local jurisdiction’s receipt of funds upon that jurisdiction performing certain actions.
I suppose if certain funds are allocated to enhance a jurisdiction’s enforcement of federal law, and especially federal immigration law, then it will be relatively easy to withhold funds. But the further the funds’ purpose strays from immigration enforcement, the harder it will be for the administration to deny the funds. In short, I think Mr. Trump probably has an uphill battle if he wants to deny even discretionary federal funding to “sanctuary jurisdictions.”
For deportation priorities, one thing I don’t know is how much the priorities are mandated by law and how much truly reside in the executive’s discretion. It seems to me that absent some legislative directive that the executive “shall” deport someone, the president has the discretion to decide against whom he wishes to act. If someone is in the US illegally, that fact in itself makes him or her a candidate for deportation.
I suspect–or hope–that deportation involves at least some due process. At the very least, the government should, in my opinion, have to prove that the person to be deported is in the US illegally. I’d also hope that the government must dot its i’s and make sure the paperwork is filled out correctly and that failure to do so would at least frustrate the government’s claim.
When it comes to the actual priorities stated in Mr. Trump’s EO, they can be construed to subject anyone to deportation who is already eligible. Therefore, that portion of the EO seems less like “priorities” and more like a statement that the executive will deport whomever it chooses, especially the statement singling out people who “[i]n the judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose a risk to public safety or national security.” The provision that someone who has “been charged with any criminal offense, where such charge has not been resolved” suggests to me that all any officer will have to do will be to accuse someone of a crime then that person will become a “priority.” Do “willful misrepresentation in connection with any official matter or application before a governmental agency” and abusing “any program related to receipt of public benefits” apply to registering one’s children for school or for such things like getting a fishing license?
Here’s what I don’t know. Perhaps the terms stated in the list of priorities have well-established meanings of which I’m ignorant. Perhaps what seems like the widest statement of discretion–the risk to public safety or national security–requires the immigration officer to jump through certain hoops or tests before he or she can invoke it. And perhaps even Mr. Obama had reserved that type of discretion for the immigration officer.
What I’d like to see
I don’t have strong convictions on immigration. I’m not bothered by having to press “1” for English or about people speaking languages around me which I can’t understand. (When I was much younger I had such problems, but I don’t anymore.)
I don’t hold much of a personal grudge against people who are in the US illegally. I get a little testy at the many discussions of “the dreamers” that ignore completely the role their parents played in putting them in their situation. But that testiness doesn’t affect my belief that the humane and necessary thing to do is to accommodate them and regularize their status. I would leave DACA in place, as Mr. Trump, I understand, has decided to do for the time being. I believe that certain people are in the short term facing labor market competition with immigrants and that their suffering ought to be acknowledged. But I believe that in the long term and in the aggregate, immigrants contribute more than they take.
I do have a philosophical view that having borders implies restricting access somehow. I believe that there are more and less humane ways to do it and that we ought to opt for the more humane. But I also believe that any form of restriction, no matter how fair or how humane, is going to catch some good, decent people in a bind they don’t personally deserve.
When it comes to denying funds to “sanctuary jurisdictions,” I don’t have a problem with, say, denying immigration enforcement funds to local jurisdictions that refuse to comply with immigration laws. I’d have a much greater problem the further one goes from “immigration enforcement” to funds for other purposes. Even if I’m right that the president will face an uphill battle in an attempt to deny such funds, it’s likely that there will be a battle and a number of years of uncertainty. And while I suspect my prognosis is probably right, I’m not certain. And even if I am mostly right, perhaps the battle will move the needle. Trump might not be able to deny a whole loaf to sanctuary jurisdictions, but he might be able to deny a much bigger portion than I’ll have anticipated.
When it comes to the priorities, I’d set them differently. My highest priority would be, in descending order of priority, the following:
- Those convicted of, or who confess to, violent felonies
- Those convicted of, or who confess to, violent misdemeanors
- Those convicted of, or who confess to, felonies
- Those convicted of a conspiracy to commit a violent crime
I would also want to reaffirm certain due process guarantees that I believe people in the US illegally should already have, as I noted above. I would also expand asylum options and admit more Syrian refugees.
Some Trump opponents argue that we shouldn’t “normalize his election.” It’s a losing argument and not likely to convince anyone of anything. In fact, it’s likely to make some people defensive who can otherwise be brought to oppose Mr. Trump or at least some of his most egregious actions.
The intention behind the argument
Trump’s campaign was based on an unprecedented appeal to racism, xenophobia, and violence. (Or “unprecedented” for the candidate of a major party since World War II.) A good number–perhaps small, but still too many for comfort–of his supporters identify openly with the “alt right” or other white nationalist creeds, and one of his “senior” advisors used to be an editor for an online magazine that gave a voice to some alt right groups. Further, it appears that Mr.Trump has either declined to disavow them, waited too long to disavow them, or has been too equivocal in disavowing them. (For a dissenting view, see Scott Alexander.)
There are other sins, too, and I haven’t even touched on the in some ways more disturbing implications of Mr. Trump’s presidency for foreign policy.
Those who say “don’t normalize” the election are saying this is no ordinary transfer of power. They’re pushing back against a tempting story that goes, “well, two people ran for election and one of them won, so let’s all come together and support the new president, and better luck next time to the losers.” The “don’t normalize” people are saying that approach is insufficient. It doesn’t represent the gravity of what has already happened and doesn’t create a bulwark against what might happen. In a very real sense, that approach makes “normal” that which ought never be normal and until recently wasn’t even openly sayable.
An unnecessary hurdle
But raising the “don’t normalize” argument creates an unnecessary hurdle for Trump opponents. With the “don’t normalize” argument, they now have to explain what normalization is, why it’s bad, how not to normalize, and how any given action a “normalizer” undertakes actually constitutes normalization–all that before and in addition to criticizing anything of substance.
And the what’s, why’s, and how’s are more difficult than it might seem from a Trump opponent’s perspective. For one thing, what does it mean as a practical matter to “normalize”? As Noah Millman has said,
If people who opposed Trump refuse to “normalize” his government, what does that mean? That they will, literally, refuse to recognize its authority — refuse to pay its taxes, resign from service in its military, and so forth? Surely not.
I’ll add that it’s impossible NOT to normalize (for certain values of “normalize”) without making some very difficult decisions. If you have a 401k or an investment account, are you prepared to disinvest from any stocks or bonds that have a stake in “normalizing” the new presidency–which is pretty much all of them? Are you prepared, as Millman says, to refuse to pay taxes, etc.? Do we start a civil war? If so, who do we kill? (For the record, I disavow killing or civil war. I’m pointing out that one reductio to which the “don’t normalize” talk can go is to a call for violence. Again, that’s not something I’m willing to endorse.)
More from the same Millman article:
I think what people mean when they say that we can’t “normalize” Trump’s behavior is some some version of “we need to keep reminding people that this is not normal.” But the “we” and “people” in that sentence are doing all the work.Whoever says that Trump shouldn’t be “normalized” is implying that somebody — the press, perhaps? — is in a position to decide what is normal, and to inform everybody else of that fact. But that’s not how norms work, and neither the press nor anybody else is in a position either to grant or withhold recognition to the new government.
In fact, the word is a way of distracting from one of the crucial jobs at hand. Trump, for example, is on strong legal ground when he says that he is exempt from conflict of interest laws. But laws can be changed — and in this case, perhaps they should be. To achieve that requires making a case, not that what Trump is doing isn’t “normal,” but that it is a bad thing worth prohibiting by law. Saying “we mustn’t normalize this behavior” rather than “we need to stop this behavior” is really a way of saying that you don’t want to engage in politics, but would rather just signal to those who already agree with us just how appalled we are.
What is to be done?
I don’t know the answer to that question. Perhaps because Trump hasn’t even assumed office yet, “don’t normalize the election” might be a more winnable or at least plausible argument because he hasn’t had a chance to do much yet other than signal certain policies and criticize people’s acting ability. Maybe when the time comes, we can follow Matt Yglesias’s suggestion and focus on the actual policies and humdrum of politics.
Or maybe we could do more than that (although we should probably do that). Take Rebecca Trotter’s blog. She’d possibly disagree with my admonition against the “don’t normalize” argument, but even if she does, she offers concrete things we can do in her series of “daily acts of resistance” posts and her ideas on “what resistance to Trump looks like.” I’m don’t read her as often as I should–and I’m not prepared to say I necessarily agree with her ideas for resistance–but she’s offering something concrete.
Maybe Trump is an authoritarian who may bring us closer to the coming next presidential tyranny. Maybe he’ll turn out to be the weak-willed, thin-skinned, incompetent his actions so far suggest he is. A third possibility is that he’s just a regular politician who’ll both modify, and fit in to, the institutional norms and incentives that are the presidency.
I realize there is real fear out there. Perhaps events will prove that fear unfounded, but I can’t and won’t deny that the fear is genuine and plausible. I’m not part of the demographics most likely to be targeted by what’s going on, and I realize that this fact gives me a detached view that others can ill-afford to take. My historian’s sensibility warns against judging people who are in circumstances I can never understand perfectly. But I do believe the “don’t normalize” argument at best will simply not work and at worst will help foster a defensive reaction in favor of Trump.
The forbidden analogy.
According to Godwin’s law and its corollaries, Hitler and Nazi analogies are almost always a bad idea. They are more likely to derail a conversation than add to it.
If you’re trying to convince someone of something, comparing them to Hitler and the Nazis is probably the wrong way to get them to listen to you. It also leaves room for one objection. If someone is so like the Nazis that the comparison is apt, they might not amendable to argument anyway. (Actually, I’m not so sure. I see some moral distance between the German who didn’t approve of but who acquiesced to Nazi rule and high-ranking leaders of the party. This might be offensive, but most citizens of the United States acquiesce to some pretty brutal policies who if asked would claim not to approve. Not saying that’s the same thing….which is one of the problems with Nazi analogies in the first place.)
The analogy is distracting. If someone is to be opposed because he is “a lot like Hitler,” then it shouldn’t be too hard to point out the ways he is objectionable without saying “and this is what the Nazis did, too.” If someone really wishes to single out an ethno-religious groups for “special treatment,” or if he endorses politically motivated violence, or if he threatens to revive something like the Palmer raids, then it shouldn’t be too hard to argue that that person is proposing something wrong. If it is hard, then your problem is different from mere analogizing.
Finally–and I’m not sure I’ve heard this objection raised before–the analogy can normalize Nazism. For the purposes of naming things as they are, of course, Nazis should be called Nazis. Neo-Nazis should also be called Nazis. The “alt right”….maybe call them Nazis, I guess, depending on who we’re talking about and what they advocate.
I’m not sure how far down the ladder it’s okay to go, though. If someone is in principle persuadable to your view, or if they supported the “unsupportable” for non-Nazi’ish reasons, then it’s possible overusing the word “Nazi” in describing that person might make less illegitimate a term that heretofore has been an automatic insult.
In a sense, overuse of the word grants Nazis “official opposition” status. If that’s how things are, then that’s how they are. But we shouldn’t overdetermine the result.
Please don’t misunderstand me. If someone comes to think the term “Nazi” is now “less illegitimate” than it was before, the fault lies primarily with that person. People sometimes choose evil, and if we make it easy for them to do so, we share some of the blame. But the principal responsibility lies with the chooser.
The analogy revived.
In two fairly recent posts Over There, I’ve seen something like that analogy used for our present situation.Before I discuss them, I’d like to point out that I am citing only the parts that speak to the issue of Nazi analogies. Each post makes more complex arguments and should not be judged solely by what I excerpt here. So read the whole thing(s).
The first post is Saul De Graw’s reflections on how bad the new presidential administration might be:
We also like to think that our laws and Constitution will protect us from the worse from happening but laws and Constitution are only as strong as the people themselves. A friend of mine posted another story on Facebook. The author of the post’s grandmother was a Jewish elementary school student in Hitler’s Germany. She needed surgery in 1932 and 1933. In 1932, all of the girl’s classmates and teachers came to visit her in the hospital. In 1933, no one did.
This story might seem hyperbolic (and it does raise Godwin’s Law) but it demonstrates that the norms of bigotry can change rapidly and seemingly overnight. Maybe the girl’s classmates and teachers did not become more anti-Semitic, but they knew it would be a serious social cost and possibly a physical cost to visit their Jewish classmate in the hospital. Most people are go along and get along types. You don’t need a nation of willing executioners. You just need enough people willing to commit acts of violence with the consent of government, and most of the rest of the people will just put their heads down to save themselves and their families.
The second is Mike Schilling’s takedown of the argument that liberals’ alleged smugness played a role in the president-elect’s victory. (In my opinion, the Nazi analogy lurks in the background, although Mike himself makes no explicit reference to it and the person he’s referring to is a post-World War II “scholar.”):
In case you’re not familiar with the work of Kevin Macdonald, let me summarize. In analyzing the recurrence of anti-Semitism through history, he found the usual explanations wanting, and hit upon one that, while not new, had been oddly absent from almost all recent academic discussions: they deserve it. Jews really are awful, he observed: clannish, avaricious, and amoral, with disdain for societal norms and non-Jews in general that makes them a cancer on any society foolish enough to admit them. Anti-semitism is an entirely natural response, in effect the immune system working to fight an infection.
Much of the reaction to the recent election has included a similar insight, which, much like Dr. Macdonald’s, is moving beyond the area that once hosted it. [The president-elect’s] popularity among voters is explained by the fact that liberals are smug. Of course voters dislikes liberals: who wouldn’t? They’re whiny losers, overeducated but lacking any sense, haters of patriotism, religion, and everything genuinely American, nanny-staters, Godless socialists, baby-killers, special snowflakes who need safe spaces. And worst of all, smug. No wonder their political fortunes are slipping; no one can stand them. (Even worse for fans of Dr. Macdonald, liberals are often… Well, you know.)
What surprised me wasn’t so much that the analogy was used (or in Mike’s case, implied). That’s to be expected on a liberal-leaning blog in which almost all authors and contributors opposed the president-elect and believed his campaign represented an unacceptably racist, xenophobic, or authoritarian turn in US politics.
What surprised me slightly more was that no one, as far as I can tell, actually complained about Godwin’s law. The closest was one comment to Mike’s post, which complained that “[i]t seems like the point of this article was to stack the concepts of liberalism, smugness, and anti-Semitism on top of each other in so many combinations that it will seem like anyone who accuses liberals of smugness is anti-Semitic.”
A lot of things could explain the unwillingness to call out Godwin’s law. It is a liberal-leaning blog, after all. And for each OP, the main point wasn’t the Nazi analogy but some other thing. In Saul’s case, he forthrightly admits the dangers of “Godwin’s law” and in Mike’s case, as I’ve said, the analogy was only implicit. And maybe those posts just happen to show up on the right day/time so that no one chose to discuss the analogy’s aptness.
Directing the analogy inward.
I’m not inclined to call Godwin’s law, either. Whatever differences I might have with Saul’s post, I have no standing whatsoever to tell him that he doesn’t really fear what he says he fears. I’d go even further and say his”…and most of the rest of the people will just put their heads down to save themselves and their families” is too charitable.It’s far from clear that the question was always saving oneself and one’s family. It might have been more like “saving oneself the inconvenience and opportunity cost” of raising even a token opposition.
For Mike’s post, a more charitable reading of his analogy is that he’s identifying a prior instance of fallacious reasoning and noting how in his opinion current commentary succumbs to similar reasoning. I’m not sure I agree completely–and I see more disanalogy than analogy–but I can’t say he’s wholly wrong, either.
In fact, looking to myself, the chance that the analogy might have some teeth haunts me in our present situation. My insistence on “understanding the voters, my own “gut” preference for the president-elect, and my perhaps too cheerful optimism that (to use what seems to be our newest cliche) “our institutions can survive the stress test”–these all suggest to me something similar to the German citizen who silently disagreed with the Nazis’ racial policies or who complacently believed Hitler might not be so bad or that his ministers and the institutions of civil society could control him.
The dangerous thing is that I could probably get away with complacency. I’m not a member of the demographics most likely to be targeted, although some of my loved ones are. And Saul said, who’s targeted and who’s not targeted can change, sometimes very quickly.
I really want to agree with Scott Alexander. He has written that as bad as the president-elect is likely to be, he’s not the white nationalist wolf some people are crying. And on paper, Mr. Alexander is right. As far as I can tell, the last president who indulged in overt racism and white nationalism was Woodrow Wilson, and the next president ain’t no Wilson. That’s probably both a good thing and a bad thing. But I also fear the new guy is as much of a wolf as he can be.
More to the point, I do realize that the way things happen in the US are different from how they happen in Europe. Not “exceptional,” just different. Our persecutions and oppressions tend to be more decentralized, though no more benign for that. And I must keep things in historical perspective. Maybe a few months from now I’ll find the new president is just a regular politician with a populist streak, of the sort we’ve had before and have survived.
Even flirting with the Hitler analogy by implication compares those of my family, friends, or readers who voted for the president-elect to Germans who voted for national socialism in the 1930s. I ask only that they realize I’m directing this analogy to myself and my own complacency. I disagree strongly with their decision, but I refuse to direct the analogy to them. As an analogy, it works best for removing the beams in the eye of those who use it. Motes in others’ eyes require a more precise instrument.
I don’t like Donald Trump. I hope he’ll be merely a bad president and not a disastrous one. I don’t like Trumpism, either. I hope (but am not optimistic) the anecdotes of racially and sexist motivated violence are either exaggerated, reported only because they’re topical, or at least don’t represent a new trend. The night of the election I was depressed and worried. You might not believe it, but I didn’t sleep at all. Not a wink. I just lay awake in bed thinking about the future.
And yet, when people in my life criticize Trump or his supporters, I get very defensive for some reason. By “people in my life” I mean family members, close friends, coworkers, and people on the blogosphere. Even my belief that we do indeed need to understand our opponents represents a certain defensiveness because my go-to (with some past exceptions) is usually to understand Trump supporters or non-liberals in general and not to understand the liberals who oppose Trump.
Perhaps some of this has to do with “flippism,” an idea I got from Jaybird, a commenter Over There. In relevant part,
It’s the basic idea that if you don’t know which of two choices are before you, you should flip a coin. Not because you should do what the coin says, mind, but because the moment the coin is in the air, you’re a lot more likely to say “OH I HOPE IT’S HEADS” at which point you’ll know which choice you actually prefer in your gut.
Then you just have to figure out how much weight to give your gut.
I bring that up because hypocrisy can work that way for people who are on the fence. Let’s say that you’re torn on a particular policy. There’s this way, there’s that way… you don’t know which is the best one… then you encounter a hypocritical politician. Are you inclined to snort and reach conclusions about all those people? Are you inclined to get defensive and start defending the guy even before you read a single attack? Well, now you know what your gut thinks.
As upset as I was about Trump’s victory, I can’t deny that somewhere in my gut I wanted him to win, if not the presidency, then at least the GOP nomination, and not in the way that some liberals wanted him to win the nomination in order to ensure a Democratic victory. In the voting booth, even though I voted for Clinton, part of me wanted to vote for Trump just to be contrarian. In Sangamon that vote wouldn’t have affected the outcome, but it’s still something I might have done.
Some of this defensiveness and “gut support” is a luxury. I’m not among the demographics most likely to be hurt by Trumpism if the worst (or even just the “moderately bad”) predictions about what it means come true. Some of it is probably also due to what my co-blogger Oscar recently described as the “-ism-lite,” which is the type of racism (and other ism’s) that are not quite as nefarious or bad as the more obvious or open kinds, but are still wrong and withal easy for its practitioners to overlook. As he puts, it instead of rejecting out of hand, “I have to parse it, process it, and then I recognize it and decide it’s not OK.”
I realize that in this post, other than noting that I do get defensive, I haven’t really explained the defensiveness or even the types of situations that elicit that defensiveness. I’m simply noting that it’s there and I’m not sure what to do with it.